How to make 5G security a reality:Talk given at the 2019 Huawei Security Technology SAB Summit, Munich, 10th July 2019 by Mitchell, Chris J
Information Security Group
How to make 5G security a reality
Chris Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London
www.chrismitchell.net
1
Information Security Group
Agenda
• Security – a high level look
• Assurance
• Role of standards
• Issues
• The way ahead?
2
Information Security Group
Agenda
• Security – a high level look
• Assurance
• Role of standards
• Issues
• The way ahead?
3
Information Security Group
5G security – where are we?
• Release 15 (R15) of 5G incorporates updated 
security features by comparison with LTE.
• R15 is ready for deployment.
• Future releases (R16, R17, …) will likely 
incorporate further new features.
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5G security – scope  I
• Like previous generations of mobile networks 
(GSM, 3G and LTE), 5G security protects the 
mobile/network link, offering:
– fraud prevention;
– data/voice traffic security;
– subscriber anonymity.
• Protects against eavesdroppers (active and 
passive) – but not against curious or malicious 
operators.
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5G security – scope  II
• That is the standardised features stop at the 
network, i.e. they do not offer end-to-end 
security.
• This is to some extent inevitable, since the 5G 
standards do not cover all means of network 
access (either for voice or data).
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5G security – novel feature
• One new feature in R15 is enhanced mobile 
subscriber confidentiality.
• Achieved using asymmetric encryption of 
permanent mobile ID using public key of 
‘home network’.
• Decryption done by home network.
• This addresses the ‘IMSI catcher’ threat. 
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5G – architectural issues
• Main focus of R15 security is enhanced mobile 
broadband (eMBB), offering reduced latency 
and higher bandwidth.
• Very much an evolution of LTE security (as 
LTE was over 3G, and 3G over GSM).
• No radical new techniques.
• Real issue, as ever, is achieving the right 
cost/risk balance.
• Designing security is about risk management!8
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Need for assurance
• As our reliance on mobile networks grows, 
the issue of assurance becomes ever more 
important.
• Operators need to have confidence that 
infrastructure equipment implements 
protocols correctly and does not have 
vulnerabilities.
• Errors/flaws in implementation threaten 
availability, a key plank of security. 
10
Information Security Group
Historical developments
• The IT industry has decades of experience in 
product and system security evaluations.
• From the Orange Book in the 1980s to today’s 
common criteria evaluations, standardised 
proceesses exist to enable assurance to be 
gained in IT security products and systems 
(primarily for government customers).
• Evaluation of ICT products/systems is not in 
such a mature state.
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Scalability issues
• Some current national approaches to 
evaluation/certification of mobile products, 
such as the HCSEC in the UK, are not 
universally applicable.
• Whilst such a national approach works for 
some markets, the costs are clearly non-trivial 
and the approach does not scale.
• A harmonised system is needed to avoid 
duplication of effort.
12
Information Security Group
Agenda
• Security – a high level look
• Assurance
• Role of standards
• Issues
• The way ahead?
13
Information Security Group
Common criteria
• The multipart international standard ISO/IEC 
15408 describes how common criteria (CC) 
evaluations should be performed.
• CC evaluations are perfomed against 
protection profiles (PPs) , with the PP being 
specific to a type of product or system.
• Whilst the underlying ideas are key, CC 
evaluations are very expensive and time-
consuming and are likely too heavy for mobile 
telecommunications systems.
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3GPP SECAM
• Within 3GPP, the Security Assurance 
Methodology (SECAM) has been developed as 
a framework for evaluating 5G products and 
systems.
• This methodology relies on product-specific 
Security Assurance Specifications (SCASs), 
analogous to PPs.
• A wide range of SCASs are being developed.
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GSMA NESAS
• In parallel, GSMA has been developing its 
Network Equipment Security Assurance 
Scheme (NESAS).
• The scheme has been piloted, and is still 
being developed.
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Advantages of standards approach
• Once the standards are in place, they will 
enable equipment certifications whose basis 
and scope is internationally recognised.
• Individual countries might choose to accept 
these evaluations unchanged or could require 
‘supplementary’ evaluations to address issues 
outside the scope of the evaluation schemes.
• In either case, this should lead to significant 
economies of scale for manufacturers and 
operators.
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Quantum computing – the threat
• 5G security, as defined in R15, relies on a mix 
of symmetric crypto (essentially the same as 
4G) and asymmetric encryption.
• The current key lengths and choices of 
algorithm make quantum computing a 
genuine threat to 5G security.
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Quantum computing – the reality
• However, large scale quantum computing is 
still years away (indeed, some question 
whether it will ever be a reality).
• Since the main threat is to mobile/network 
authentication and key establishment, there 
is time to replace currently used techniques .
• Advance planning is in place to enable 
evolution to post-quantum crypto.
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Security as a cost
• Security is a cost for manufacturers and operators.
• The current 5G security features are present 
primarily to:
– prevent fraudulent network use;
– give assurance to users that their privacy is not impacted 
by use of a broadcast communications medium.
• The current features are present by default and do 
not offer operators the opportunity to charge or 
offer a ‘high security’ premium product.
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Cost versus benefit
• As has always been the case, adding new 
security features will require careful cost/risk 
analysis.
• A good example of this is the fact that only in 
5G have IMSI catchers been fully addressed.
• The (ever-decreasing) cost impact of 
implementing asymmetric crypto on mobile 
devices was finally deemed worth paying to 
address the IMSI catcher threat.
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New security features
• R16 and later versions of the standards will 
provide support growing numbers of vertical 
applications of 5G.
• This is likely to necessitate additional security 
features.
• Decisions will be made on a cost versus risk 
basis.
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Limits to security
• There is only so much that can be achieved by 
adding security features to 5G.
• End-to-end security is likely to be something 
requiring security at the application layer.
• There are limits also to the levels of 
availability possible for mobile networks, 
since coverage will never be 100%.
• We need to be realistic …
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A global approach to assurance
• The industry urgently needs agreement on a 
unified basis for product evaluation and 
certification.
• This should be provided by SECAM and/or 
NESAS.
• However, effort is needed to ensure the 
standards are delivered in a timely way.
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Integration with other initiatives
• The recent EU Cyber Security regulation 
covering an assurance framework for a wide 
range of IT and ICT products potentially 
dovetails with current 3GPP/GSMA assurance 
standards efforts.
• Ultimately, we (users and operators alike) 
all need a unified, robust and cost-effective 
way of gaining an appropriate level of 
assurance in mobile systems.
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